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CHARTER CONFLICTS. WHA TISPARLIAMENT'SROLE? BY JANET




Typically, books by political scientists about the Charter tend to
elaborate and then lament the usurpation of legislative powers by the
courts.3 Janet Hiebert's Charter Conflicts: What is Parliament's Role?,
attempts to stake out different terrain. Her novel and lively contribution to
this debate is to focus on the parliamentary side of the equation of judicial
activism. She is critical of Parliament's passivity in the face of judicial
intervention on matters of public policy by means of the articulation and
adjudication of Charter rights. She argues that constitutional interpretation
is a "shared responsibility" between courts and Parliament. In particular,
she advances the premise that Parliament has a distinctive role to play in
the delineation of section 1 justifications for the limitation of Charter rights,
and more explicitly in the decision to invoke the "notwithstanding" override
under section 33 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
She advocates a "relational approach" to Charter determinations,
incorporating legislative and judicial perspectives in a collaborative rather
than hierarchical format. In so doing, she self-consciously situates herself
somewhere in the middle of the judicial activist spectrum, refreshingly
distant from both the acidity of Charter critics and the nafvet6 of Charter
cheerleaders. However, far from resolving the tensions surrounding judicial
power in the Charter era, her approach raises essential questions-how
should this judicial-legislative collaboration take place, and who should
have the last word? To her credit, Hiebert does not sidestep such thorny
questions. She believes Parliament's role in disseminating Charter values
should be transparent and direct, and sees this role integrated with the
1 [ Charter Conflicts].
2 Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.
3See e.g. Frederick Lee Morton & Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party
(Toronto: Broadview, 2000); Christopher P. Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter: Canada and the
Paradox of Liberal Constitutionalism (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1993). For a discussion of these
and other contributors, see Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic
Dialogue (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) at 69-95.
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parliamentary committee structure.' One of the strengths of her analysis is
that it is rooted in the realities of parliamentary governance.
There is much to agree with in Hiebert's view that the Charter gives
rise to obligations for Parliament as well as for judges. My broader concern
with Hiebert's framework of shared responsibility between Parliament and
the courts for the elaboration of Charter values, however, is that it glosses
over the important obligations of the executive branch in the development
and implementation of those values. Whether one views the judicial-
legislative relationship as one of "dialogue" or, as Hiebert prefers,
"conversation,"5 neither party would have much to say but for the role
played by the executive in advising on the legislative options available to
government, in defending legislation (or declining to do so) before the
courts, and in interpreting the effects and implications of judicial orders
following litigation.6 Both literally and figuratively, when Parliament and
the courts speak to one another, it is through executive action.
Not only is the executive role significant, it is also salutary. The
independence of the civil service (and of government lawyers in particular)
and the obligation of public officials to act in the public interest, permit and
may in some circumstances require the executive branch of government to
act as an important check against both the majoritarian excesses of the
legislature and the countermajoritarianism of the judiciary. It is not for
nothing that then-Chief Justice Lamer referred to Canada's separation of
powers as the "backbone of our constitutional system."7 While it is unfair
to criticize Hiebert for devoting too little attention to the role of the
executive (her study, after all, is about Parliament's role under the Charter),
the focus on Parliament's obligations overlooks important dynamics
regarding the formation of Charter values and their implications for
democratic legitimacy. As a result, Hiebert assigns to Parliament a
potential role that it may lack both the capacity and the authority to play.
4 Hiebert contemplates a report that would be made to Parliament during the second-reading
debate of a bill, which would, in her words, not be "overly technical" or "lawyerly." See Charter Conflicts
supra note 1 at 66.
5
Ibid. at 50.
6 On the role of the executive in the judicial-legislative dialogue, see Matthew A. Hennigar,
"Players and the Process: Charter Litigation and the Federal Government." Windsor Y.B. Access Just.
[forthcoming in fall 2003]; Lorne Sossin, "The Politics of Soft Law: How Judicial Review Influences
Bureaucratic Decision-Making in Canada" in Simon Halliday & Marc Hertogh, eds., Judicial Review
and Bureaucratic Impact: International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press) [forthcoming 2004].
Cooper v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), [19961 3 S.C.R. 854 at 867, Lamer C.J.C.,
concurring.
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This review is organized into two parts. In the first part, I examine
Hiebert's argument and explore in more detail her application in the
context of gay and lesbian rights. I examine her thesis in light of recent legal
and political developments relating to same-sex marriage. In the second
part, I explore her conclusions regarding the judicial-legislative relationship
in the elaboration of Charter rights, and suggest reasons why more attention
should be paid to the executive branch and its role as an intermediary
between judicial and legislative authority, and as a conduit for judicial and
legislative communication.
II. A RELATIONAL APPROACH TO CHARTER POLITICS
The centrepiece of Hiebert's contribution to the literature on
Charter politics is what she terms a "relational approach" to the interaction
between courts and Parliament. Hiebert explains this approach in the
following terms:
A relational approach assumes that both Parliament and courts have valid insights into how
legislative objectives should reflect and respect the Charter's normative values. Yet their
judgments may be different. The benefits of conceiving Charter judgment in relational terms
arise from the responsibility each body incurs to respect Charter values, from the exposure
to judgments made by those differently situated, and from the opportunity to reflect upon
the merits of contrary opinion. The normative goal ... is that each body satisfy itself that its
judgment respects Charter values, particularly when faced with the other's contrary
judgment.8
Hiebert builds the case for her relational approach by reviewing the
relationship between courts and legislatures in a number of high-profile
Charter settings: tobacco advertising, sexual assault trials, the collection and
use of DNA, rules and exemptions for search warrants, and equality claims
of lesbians and gays. These chapters are mostly descriptive accounts of the
leading judicial decisions and the legislative (and political) responses they
provoked in each setting. Hiebert's writing is clear and accessible and
manages to capture the complexity of political and judicial decision making.
While there is not enough space for a detailed assessment of each case
study, I will consider her analysis of the equality claims of gays and lesbians
in more depth, and examine its implications in light of recent developments
in the field of same-sex marriage rights.
Hiebert charts the story of same-sex rights under the Charter from
a number of vantages. 9 She traces the evolution of the Supreme Court's
8 Charter Conflicts supra note 1 at 52.
Ibid. at 162-99.
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thinking on equality rights through the 1990s, from the tentative steps taken
in Canada (A.G.) v. Mossop0 to the dramatic leaps of Vriend v. Alberta"
and M. v. H. 2 She identifies in these cases a perceptible shift in the
Supreme Court (both intellectually and in terms of its composition) from
a view of equality as equal benefits and equal burdens towards a view of
equality rights as guaranteeing equal respect and dignity from the state as
well. Hiebert avoids one-dimensional narratives when examining Charter
cases. She canvasses lawyers' arguments and legislative responses across
multiple provincial and federal jurisdictions, and does so in an engaged and
dispassionate style. Importantly, she also discusses the significance of these
cases to the gay and lesbian community, emphasizing the ambivalence with
which even the court victories were greeted.
Hiebert asserts that judicial power has played a pivotal role in the
context of gay and lesbian rights because governments have reneged on
their "responsibility to evaluate and make prudential and principled
decisions about how to reassess the complex policy networks of social
benefits and obligations."13 She maintains that the legislature is better
suited than the courts to "consult, engage in dialogue and conduct
research" regarding social policy reforms such as marriage rights. Presaging
future events, Hiebert cautions, "Yet, if legislatures are too slow in
changing social policy, courts will likely become impatient with legislative
indecision and more active in proffering remedies."'4
Of course, this is precisely what transpired. While two provincial
appeal courts were content to order the elimination of discrimination on
grounds of sexual orientation in the common law definition of marriage
(thus defining marriage as a union between "two people" rather than a
"man and a woman") but to suspend the effect of this order to permit the
legislature time to respond, in the summer of 2003, the Ontario Court of
Appeal held that a suspended order was inappropriate and that the effect
of the changed common law definition would be immediate. 5 The Ontario
Court of Appeal's decision ended a meandering, squabbling parliamentary
committee that was holding national hearings on the same-sex question.'6
10[1993] 1 S.C.R. 554.
11[1998] 1 S.C.R. 493.
12[1999] 2 S.C.R. 3.
13 Ibid. at 199.
14 Ibid.
15 Halpern v. Canada (A.G.) (2003), 65 O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.).
16 See Tonda MacCharles, "PM won't appeal Ontario court ruling Ottawa joins the Netherlands,
Belgium" Toronto Star (18 June 2003) Al.
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This committee represented much of what Hiebert's approach appears to
aspire to: consultation, engagement, and the evaluation of social
preferences. The result, however, was a divided, partisan and ponderous
process.
Whereas judicial review is supposed to be a reactive and sluggish
mechanism for social intervention in the face of responsive and proactive
government initiative, the example of gay and lesbian rights has turned this
assumption on its head. Governments have found themselves more often
than not reacting, often sluggishly, to the proactive initiative of courts. The
tension between the majoritarian and partisan impulses of legislative action
and the independent and rights-driven impulses of courts is mostly a
healthy one, as long as the executive branch of government is present to
mediate the judicial-legislative relationship.
III. CHARTER POLITICS AS A THREE-LEGGED STOOL
Parliament deserves a more meaningful role in determining the
balance between political needs and Charter protections. Hiebert's call for
parliamentarians to take section 33 more seriously, for example, is
persuasive. This was clearly intended by the design of the Constitution to be
the legislative focus of the Charter debate. It seems to me less tenable,
however, to insert Parliament in the context of adjudicating the
reasonableness of Parliament's limits on rights and freedoms through
section 1 of the Charter.
Section 33 captures a process of legislative deliberation. In this
context, Parliament speaks through its legislation. Under section 1, by
contrast, the onus rests with government to justify the reasonableness of
Charter infringements. This means it is up to the executive branch of
government to defend legislation.
While Hiebert notes the current federal practice for a report from
the Attorney General to accompany proposed legislation that sets out the
degree of risk of Charter litigation attached to the legislation, she does not
explore the implications of the fact that it is also the Attorney General who
advances the Crown's position in Charter litigation, circumscribes what
kinds of laws may come before the legislature, and interprets the
significance of judicial decision making, overseeing and advising what
legislative or administrative responses are justified and appropriate.17
1 7Another important aspect of the executive involvement in elaborating Charter values that merits
more attention in Hiebert's analysis is the decision to launch a constitutional reference, as in the same-
sex marriage case.
2004]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
With this added complexity of the executive role in the legislative-
judicial relationship in mind, I return to Hiebert's notion of a parliamentary
committee with the mandate to offer reports (during second-reading of a
Bill) on the justifications for laws which might be seen to infringe Charter
rights. 8 She emphasizes that the purpose of parliamentary Charter scrutiny
is neither to establish a rival or parallel procedure for undertaking risk
assessments nor to use rights language in a partisan manner to delay or
block government initiatives, but is rather to ensure that Parliament is
aware of the consequences of legislation for protected values, and may
make careful judgments about whether legislation is reasonable and
justified. What role should such a report play in the court's Charter
deliberations? Should parliamentary reports elaborating Charter values be
considered more or less significant than the Hansard record of
parliamentary debate and ministerial statements that already form part of
the record of most Charter cases? 9 While legislative history may shed light
on legislative intent and reflect the depth of legislative deliberations, it may
just as often capture the emotions, distortions and distractions of political
and partisan struggles.
Hiebert's support for a more robust parliamentary role in
elaborating Charter values is based, in part, on her healthy skepticism
regarding the court's capacity for policy analysis. She is surprisingly less
critical, however, when it comes to the capacities of Parliament. While she
acknowledges that Parliament has become a "weak" institution, she
nonetheless envisions a parliamentary process able to undertake extensive
consultations, engage in research and stimulate thoughtful debate. Hiebert
also appears strangely untroubled by the risk that such a parliamentary
process would lack independence and be vulnerable to partisan interests
and influences. As Roland Penner has noted, Hiebert appears to
underestimate the potential for such a parliamentary committee to become
hostage to political lobbying or the vicissitudes of public opinion polls.
2°
To suggest that it is important to delve more deeply into the
complexity of parliamentary, bureaucratic and legislative processes under
the Charter does not detract from the view that Parliament has a key role
in the elaboration of Charter values. It does cast doubt, however, on
18 Charter Conflicts supra note 1 at 66.
19 In light of Heibert's argument that the courts should take more seriously the deliberative
process of Parliament, I would have thought that the court's jurisprudence on the treatment of
parliamentary debates and reports in Charter cases would be more extensively discussed. See e.g. Peter
W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 57.1(a)
20 Roland Penner, Book Review of Charter Conflicts: What is Parliament's Role? by Janet L.
Hiebert (2003), 28 Queen's L.J. 731.
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Hiebert's conclusion that parliamentary hearings and reports should be the
vehicle to give expression to that role. Most legislation begins with a section
designed to specify the purpose for enacting the statute-or the mischief it
is intended to address. This, typically, is the point of departure for a court's
analysis of section 1. These sections should represent the embodiment of
the parliamentary deliberation and debate over Charter values. A second
best approach is to locate parliamentary guidance on the purpose of
legislation in preambles, which have become elaborative of legislative
intent."' Whether Parliament consulted widely or narrowly, whether it
conducted extensive research or none at all, or whether it balanced
competing claims or advanced the interest of one group over another,
however, does not necessarily shed light on whether the infringement of a
Charter right is justified. For Hiebert's ideal of "relational" Charter values
to be achieved, the court itself would have to stake out a position on the
"quality of the process" pursued by Parliament. 2 On what basis is the court
to distinguish a good process from a bad one? Judicial sensitivity respecting
whether Parliament has or has not "consciously reflected on Chartervalues"
seems an implausible mandate for the court to undertake 3
In the final analysis, Hiebert's relational approach, like Peter Hogg
and Allison Thornton's dialogue approach, assumes a partnership where
there arguably is none and where none was ever intended. 4 Legislatures are
majoritarian institutions. Courts, by contrast, most often play a
countermajoritarian role in the defence of individual rights and vulnerable
groups. This tension between majoritarian and countermajoritarian
interests is healthy and necessary for a sophisticated democracy to
function.' It is this tension, I would suggest, that makes the role of the
executive branch so crucial. Just as a two-legged stool cannot stand on its
own, so the role of the executive is crucial to the stability of Canada's
Constitutional system, providing balance and ballast for the judicial-
legislative relationship.
21 For a recent survey of preambles, see Kent Roach, "The Uses and Abuses of Preambles in
Legislation" (2001) 47 McGill L.J. 129.
22 Charter Conflicts supra note 1 at 70.
23What the Court has said on the subject is simply that the government has no obligation to
consult affected groups before legislative action is taken. See e.g. NWAC v. Canada, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 627
and Bell v. Canadian Telephone Employees Assn., [2003] 1 S.C.R. 884.
2 4 See Lorraine Weinrib, "Canada's Constitutional Revolution: From Legislative to Constitutional
State" (1999) 33 Isr. L. R. 13.
25 For discussion, see A. Wayne MacKay, "The Legislature, the Executive and the Courts: The
Delicate Balance of Power or Who is Running this Country Anyway?" (2001) 24 Dal. L.J. 37.
2004]
196 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 42, NO. I
IV. CONCLUSION
While I disagree with some of Hiebert's conclusions and
recommendations, I found her analysis lucid, engaging and thought-
provoking. This book constitutes a significant contribution to the study of
Charter and judicial activism. Hiebert has highlighted the disturbing
tendency of Parliament to play a passive and reactive role in the
articulation of Charter values. Where I differ from Hiebert is with respect
to how Parliament ought to express its views on those values. In my view,
her "relational approach" neglects the complex and fundamental roles
played by the executive branch. Ultimately, it is the three-legged stool of
Canada's constitutional system and the dynamic relationship between the
legislative, executive and judicial branches of government that provides the
surest safeguards for the preservation of the rule of law and democratic
legitimacy in the Charter era.
